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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
\V. J. TREADWAY,

VERA GENE
TREAD,YAY, and J. E. TREADWAY, co - partners doing business
under the firm name and style of
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No.
7417

YS.

HEBER ULENN,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

)

'

I

STATEMENT OF F AC'rS
The facts involved in the instant case are, for the
most part, in direct dispute. Appellant's statement of
facts and ''summary of facts'' present only his version
of the transactions and are interwoven with arguments
of his position. Respondents therefore feel that it would
be of help to the court to make a brief recital of the
facts we feel are material to a proper consideration of
the ·case.
Respondents are co-partners doing business under
the firm name and style of Kenworth Sales Company
engaged in the business of selling trucks and are dis-
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tributors for Kenworth l\lotor Trucks in this area (R.
77). Appellant, a contractor, contacted the respondents
for the purpose of purchasing a large truck to use in
his business and on February 13, 1946 signed a purchase
order for the same (Exhibit 1). He advised respondents'
representative, Mr. Golightly, that he desired a truck
that would haul his ''Cats'' upon a flatbed and also
permit the attachment of a semi trailer upon which to
carry his "Shovel" (R. 94). By the term "Cats" appellant referred to Caterpillar tractors and by ''Shovel''
to an excavating shovel. He was advised by Golightly
that it would probably be one year before delivery could
be made (R. 90).
Approximately thirty days after the execution of
Exhibit 1, W. J. Treadway, one of the respondent partners, called upon Appellant to discuss the truck then
upon order (R. 349). Mr. Treadway advised appellant
that the truck ordered was not big enough to haul
"Cats" upon its back, but that one could be constructed
to perform this task. Appellant advised Treadway that
he not only wanted a truck big enough to haul a ''Cat''
but that he also wanted a truck to be so constructed
that it could pull a semi trailer upon which to haul his
"Shovel". Mr. Treadway then advised appellant that
he would run into trouble trying to build a truck to perform these two functions but appellant advised Mr.
Treadway that he could "handle it." Mr. Treadway
further advised appellant that a truck so constructed
would overload the front tires but appellant said that
he would be able to take care of that (R. 350, 351).
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Subsequently :.lr. rrreadway received a'' face sheet''
and a letter from the engineering deparhnent of Kenworth ~lotor Truck Corporation which he exhibited to
the appellant ( R. 352). rrhis letter questioned the advisability of ront'tructing a truck as desired by appellant
because of the long wheel base and the possibility that
too much load would be thrown upon the front axle of
the truck (R. 353, 357). Appellant told Treadway that
the engineering department wasn't buying the truck,
that he was buying it and that was the way he wanted
it built (R. 359).
In December, 1946, appellant was advised that his
truck was ready for delivery in Seattle, whereupon on
December 27, 1946 appellant issued his check to respondents in the sum of $16,322.10 for payment in full for
the truck (Exhibit 3). The truck was delivered to appellant on or about January 2, 1947.
At no time did appellant, in his discussions with
1\Ir. Golightly and ~[r. Treadway advise them that he
intended to use the truck to haul road oils (R. 216, 359,
~60).

During the ensuing year after the delivery of the
truck respondents had occasion to make various repairs
to the truck, which repairs and services are set forth
in respondents' bill of particulars (R. 6). In January,
1948 respondents, at the request of appellant, shortened
the wheel base of the truck, for which no charge was
made to appellant. It was not until this time that appel-
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lant made any complaint to respondents regarding the
trud< (R. ::367).
Respondents corrnnenced this action by filing their
cOinplaint wherein they sou_ght recovery for the reasonable value of the materials and services rendered to
appellant. Appellant filed his answer to the complaint
and in an amended counterclaim sought to recover,
among other things, the sum of $20,000.00 for alleged
loss of profits resulting from the failure of the truck to
haul road oil from Woods Cross, Utah to McGill, Nevada,
claiming that he was forced to hire other carriers to haul
the road oil.
ARGUMENT
rrhe evidence presented at the trial of the instant
case by appellant and respondents was in direct conflict
as to all material issues. This being the situation we
feel that the only major question confronting this court
upon appeal is whether or not there was introduced at
the trial sufficient evidence to substantiate the findings
of the lower court.
It is fundamental, and a well settled rule in the
State of Utah, that the trial court may determine the
facts and judge the credibility of witnesses and that the
findings of the trial court, if supported by any substantial evidence, will not be disturbed upon appeal;
furthermore, this court has held that in such a case, it
cannot weigh and pass on conflicting evidence, or pass
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the eredibility of witne~~e:::;. In Re Dong Ling Hing's
7~ Utah :12-t 2 Pac. 2d 902, 904.

Estate.

nccar<':o c. Booth, rt al., 97 Utah
2d

lo:~, ~n

Pae.

-l--l-~):

Jensen r. Logall City, 96 Utah ;)22, 88 Pac.
2d -l-59.

\Yith the foregoing rule of law in nlind the respondents will first endeavor to set forth the evidence which
substantiate~ the trial court's pertinent findings and
then disc-uss some of appellant's assignments of error.
POINT L
THE EVIDENCE "\VAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERS 2 AND 3 TO THE EFFECT
THAT RESPONDENTS SOLD GOODS, WARES AND MERCHANDISE TO APPELLANT FOR THE REASONABLE
VALUE OF $1,579.08 AND THAT APPELLANT FAILED
AND REFUSED TO PAY SAID SUM OR ANY PART THEREOF.

Appellant in his brief has not assigned as error the
trial court's findings, Numbers 2 and 3 and has not discussed the issues therein in his brief. These findings are
supported by the testimony of W. J. Treadway, one of
the respondents, in his testimony (R. 77-79).
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 5 TO THE EFFECT THAT,
APPELLANT, REGARDLESS OF RESPONDENTS' WARNING, SPECIFIED THE TYPE OF TRUCK THAT HE DESIRED. CLAIMING THAT THE SAME WOULD BE SATISFACTORY FOR HIS PURPOSES.
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Appellant, at the trial, introduced testimony to the
effect that the truck delivered to him by respondents
was improperly designed and would not perform the
functions for which it was intended. He maintained
that the wheel base of the truck was too long and that
as a consequence thereof too much weight was thrown
upon the front tires.
In contradiction to this contention respondent, W. J.
Treadway, testified that approximately one month after
JHr. Glenn had signed Exhibit Number 1 on February
13, 1946 he paid a visit to Glenn for the purpose of advising him that the truck so ordered on Exhibit Number
1 would not be big enough to satisfy Glenn's needs.
During this conversation appellant advised Treadway
of the type of truck he desired and he was warned by
Treadway that such a truck would cause appellant trouble unless the load was properly balanced upon the truck.
1 Regardless of this appellant advised Treadway that he
wanted the truek in accordance with his specifications.
The respondent, W. J. Treadway, testified as follows (R. 350) :

Q. (By Mr. E. H. Callister) Just tell us
what transpired when you went to l\ir. Glenn's
house~

A. I told Mr. Glenn that order he gave Mr.
Golightly, to haul his equip1nent, if he was going
to haul these cats and bulldozers on the back of
the truck it wasn't big enough.
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.\nd lh' ~aid, .. \Y<.:~ll, that i~ \\'hat I want. 1
want a truck big enough to haul a eat and hulldozer on the back of the truek. ''
l said. · '\Y t..'ll, we can build ~rou a truck that
will haul that, but we will have to change the
specifiea tions frmn the order you gave l\f r.
Golightly.''
And I asked him what loading space he
\\~anted back of the cab, and he said he wanted
twenty feet.
I said, ''Well, we can build that truck that
way.''
And he said, ·'Xow, I want to pull a low bed
hack of it, also."
~\nd I said, "Now, 1Ir. Glenn, you are going
t() run into trouble trying to build a truck to
hold a cat and bulldozer on the back of the truck,
and still build a low bed to pull a semi trailer.''
"In order to balance that truck with your
cat on its back, your frame is going to project
over the hack axle until you can't hook the semi
on it."
He said, ''I can take care of that. I can balance that cat back there to where I can handle
it.''
And I told him we could build that frarne to
where it would be detachable, and to where we
could bolt the back sections together; that when
we hauled his cat he would use that frame on it,
and when he put his low bed on he would have
to unbolt that section, in order for his gooseneck
of his semi-trailer to hook onto his truck. He
didn't want that. He wanted it built with the
wheels put on the extreme rear end of the truck,
and a twenty foot loading space on the back of
the cab.
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So, I questioned him <-1uite a bit about the
overloading of the front tires that way.
And he said no, that was all right, he could
take care of it. \¥hen he pulled that low bed with
his shovel on it, he wanted that space for the
boom of his shovel to go up back of the cab on
the truck, and have a space there for it.''
Mr. Treadway further testified (R. 358) that the
long wheel base was necessary in order to conform to
the expressed desires of the appellant and that the truck,
as delivered, could have met the needs and desires of
appellant provided the latter properly bal·anced the
load (R. 361, 362,402, 403).
The foregoing testimony of respondent, W. J. Treadway is supported by appellant's own testimony (R. 99,
100) to the effect that he told Treadway he wanted a
truck to haul freight, put a flatrack on, put a fifth wheel
on, and haul a fifty-ton shovel. In other words, appellant, in ordering the truck, gave Treadway the specifications of the type of truck he desired.
The testimony set forth above is more than ample
to substantiate the trial court's findings of fact Number
5 and it was within the province of the Trial Judge to
believe Treadway as against conflicting testimony given
by the appellent.
The Trial Court, believing the evidence of respondents to the effect that appellant designated the type
of truck he desired and insisted upon it being built in
the manner specified regardless of respondents' warning,
was justified in rendering judgment against appellant
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upon his counterclaiin. This evidence negatived any
expre8s warranty or responsibility upon responrlents.

POil\T Ill.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 6 TO THE EFFECT THAT
APPELLANT WAS FAMILIAR WITH HEAVY TRUCKS
AND THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT RESPONDENTS WERE MERE SALES AGENTS FOR THE
MANUFACTURER OF THE TRUCK.

It is a well settled principle of law that where an
agent acts on behalf of a disclosed principal his acts
and con tracts are considered as the acts and contracts
of the principal, and, in the absence of an agreement
otherwise, involves no personal liability on the part of
the agent to a third person. This rule applies to express
or implied warranties.
2 Am. Juri::;., p. 248 ;
2 C. J., p. 812.
The appellant, Glenn, had been a contractor for
approximately 25 years (R. 87) and had used equip1nent
similar to the truck involved for approximately 8 to 12
years (R. 222). The original purchase order (Exhibit
Number 1), which appellant signed on February 13,
1946, is clearly designated as a contract of purchase
between appellant and Kenworth Motor Truck Corporation ..Mr. Golightly signed on behalf of respondents who
were clearly designated in Exhibit 1 as a sales agent.
Exhibit 1, in and of itself, clearly establishes the fact
that respondents were the mere agents of the truck
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manufacturer and thus not personally liable for any
breach of implied or express warranty.
In ·addition to Exhibit 1, the agency relationship is
further established by the testimony of appellant (R.
107) to the effect that he knew the truck was being
manufactured in Seattle and also by Exhibit 6 which
is a letter directed to Kenworth Motor Truck Corporation, Seattle, Washington, by appellant's attorney.
The foregoing clearly supports the trial court's
finding of fact Number 6, which finding negatives any
liability upon the part of the respondents for the damages claimed by appellant.
POINT IY.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 7 TO THE EFFECT THAT
RESPONDENTS' ADVISED APPELLANT THAT THE
TRUCK MANUFACTURER WOULD NOT GUARANTEE
PERFORMANCE OF THE TRUCK AS ORDERED BY APPELLANT AND THAT APPELLANT, REGARDLESS OF
THI'S FACT, DESIRED THE TRUCK.

Upon examination Mr. Treadway testified that subsequent to his conversation with appellant in March,
1946, he received a letter from the engineering department of Kenworth Motor Truck Corporation questioning the wheel base of the truck which appellant had
ordered (R. 352). This letter was exhibited to Mr.
Glenn.
The respondent, W. J. Treadway, testified as follows (R. 357) :

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

..A. They told me that-thi8 letter said the
wheel base of the truck was long. •• If he is
going to load his cat and bulldozer on the back
end of the truck, and he will balance it back
there, why, he will he all right with it."
They said, "If he attempts to load weight
right back of the cab, the truck, with a long wheel
base, it w·ould throw all the weight on your front
axle.''
And "Jlr. Glenn told n1e he could balance his
equipment back there, and he wanted it built that
way, because he wanted to pull his semi-trailer
"~th it.
Q. Because he wanted to pull his seini-trailer with it'
A. He wanted to pull a se1ni-trailer with
his shovel and other equipntent on it, at timet;.
Appellant refused to heed the warning contained
in the letter. In this connection Mr. Treadway testified
as follows ( R. 358, 359) :
(~.
\Yhat, if anything, did :Mr. Glenn say
during this conversation in which you wei·e discussing the letter from the Engineering Department~

A. He said the Engineering Deparhnen t
wasn't buying the truck; he was buying it, and
that was the way he wanted it built.
The trial court saw fit to believe the foregoing testimony of Mr. Treadway which is sufficient evidence to
support Finding of Fact Number 7, which finding negatives any responsibility by respondents for breach of
any implied or express warranty.
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POINTY.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 9 TO THE EFFECT THAT
IT WAS NOT WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE
PARTIES THAT THE TRUCK WAS TO BE USED TO HAUL
ROAD OIL.

This particular finding deserves particular attention
inasmuch as appellant, in his brief, has directed all of
his argument to the second cause of action as set forth
in his amended counterclaim (R. 32). In this second
cause of action the appellant sought damages for loss
of profits allegedly sustained upon a road construction
job in the St,ate of Nevada. He alleged that by reason
of the defective truck he was unable to haul road oil
upon the same which necessitated the hiring of other
carriers which resulted in a loss of profits to himself in
the amount of $20,000.00.
. It is well settled that in order to recover as damages
for breach of warranty loss of profits to the buyer, such
profits must have been within the contemplation of the
parties at the time the warranty was made. 46 A rn.
Juris., Paragraph 745. In the instant case the warranty,
if one was made, was made either by Mr. Golightly on
February 13, 1946 or by Mr. Treadway one month later.
Appellant testified that on both occasions he advised
the parties that he intended to use the truck to haul
road oil for the Nevada Road Construction Job. It is
important to point out that the appellant testified (R.
10) that he had the contract with the State of Nevada
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to build the road at the tinte of his discm:;sion with Mr.
Treadway in l\farch, 1946. This was a false statement,
for as ~hown in Exhibit '· £-\ ·' the bid upon the job was
not accepted until at least June 4, 1946.
In contradiction to appellant's testinwny :Mr.
Golightly (R. 216) and ~Ir. Treadway (R. 359, 360)
both te~tified that at no tin1e during the entire negotiations with appellant did he advise them that he intended to use the truck for the purpose of hauling road
oil. The court was entitled to believe the testimony of
:Jir. Golightly and ~[r. Treadway as against that of the
appellant.
HoweYer In addition to the testinwny of .Mr.
Golightly and Mr. Treadway other facts and circumstances are found in the record which discredit appellant's testimony regarding the road oil haul and which
indicate that appellant's second cause of action, as contained in his amended counterclaim, was but an afterthought and certainly not within his reasonable contemplation at the time the truck was ordered. These
facts and circumstances are related as follows in their
chronological sequence:
(a) On February 13, 1946 appellant signed the
original purchase order (Exhibit 1) for a truck at which
time, according to l\1r. Golightly, no mention was made
of using the truck to haul road oil.
(b) In March, 1946 appellant conversed with Mr.
Treadway regarding changes in the specifications of
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the truck and, according to .Mr. Treadway, no rnention
was made of using the truck to haul oil.
(c) On Page 1 of Exhibit A which is a copy of the
contract between Sumsion and Glenn for the Nevada
State Road Job, it is set forth that bids would be received until 2:15 P.M. of June 4, 1946. Obviously, appellarnt did not know whether or not he had, the job at the
time of his conversation with Golightly and Treadway
and the.refore, it could not have b~en within the contempla-tion of the p~arties that appellarnt might suJJe1·
loss of profits from the operation of am unestablished
business.
(d) The truck was not delivered to appellant until
January 2, 1947 and he did not commence the hauling
of oil by other carriers to the Nevada Road Job until
.June, 1947 (Exhibit 4).
(e) On November 20, 1947 appellant's attorney
wrote a letter to Kenworth Motor Truck Corporation
(Exhibit 6) wherein complaint was made of the truck
but no mention made of any loss of profits from the
road oil haul.
(f) On or about January 5th respondents shortened the wheel base of appellant's truck (Exhibit C)
at which time no mention was made of any loss of profits
from the road oil haul.
(g) On August 11, 1948 appellant filed his answer
and counterclaim to respondents' complaint wherein
nothing is contained relating to any loss of profits from
the road oil haul.
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On Deceu1ber 11, 1948 appellant·~ deposition
was taken (Exhibit G) wherein he was asked at Page 8
of that deposition, what he had told Mr. Treadway he
wanted the truck to do. Appellant answered that he
wanted the truck to haul a cat upon its back and pull a
semi-trailer behind it for the purpose of moving a fiftyflve ton shovel. At no place in the deposition, although
given the opportunity so to do, did appellant rrtake the
state1nent that he wanted the truck for the purpose of
hauling road oil ( R. 538).
( i) On January 18, 1948 the trial court held a
pre-trial hearing and entered its pre-trial order on the
same date. At this time no mention was made nor any
issue raised regarding loss of profits from the hauling
of roarl oil (R. 27).
(j) On January 24, 1949, the first day of the trial,
the appellant filed his amended counterclaim in which
he sought damages for the loss of profits from the road
oil haul. This was the first time that a;n;y mention or
iwt,·cation was made by the appellant that he had sufferPd any such loss.

Certainly it is apparent from the foregoing that
appellant's claim for damages as contained in his second
cause of action was but an after-thought and was never
within his contemplation nor within the contemplation
of the respondents during any part of their negotiations.
l\fr. Glenn's testimony was to the effect that he
intended to use the truck to haul road oil from Woods
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Cross, Utah over the highways of the State of Utah to
the road construction job near McGill, Nevada. He
stated that he planned to put a 5000 gallon tank upon
the truck and another 5000 gallon tank upon his trailer,
thus enabling him to haul 10,000 gallons of road oil at
one time (R. 186). He further testified (R. 187) that
the total weight of his truck, together with the two 5000
gallon tanks, filled with road oil, and excluding the
weight of the trailer, would amount to at least 106,000
pounds. He admitted that this would be in excess of
the weight permitted by the laws of the State of Utah
(R. 187).
Mr. R. A. Gould, an experienced tank truck operator, testified (R. 305) that the maximum amount of gasoline which could be hauled by truck and trailer was
7000 gallons and that road oil weighed more than did
gasoline. He also stated (R. 318) that it would be impossible to build or design a truck and trailer that would
carry 10,000 gallons of road oil and operate upon the
highways of the State of Utah.
Thus, it is seen that not only was the issue of loss
of profits from the road oil haul an after-thought but
that appellant's alleged plan for hauling the oil was
impossible to carry out.
It should be noted that appellant's loss of profits,
if any, from the failure to haul the road oil in the truck
was extremely speculative and uncertain of ascert·ainment. This is particularly true with respect to the rela-
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tionship between the appellant and 1\lr. J in1 Su1nsion.
~-\ppellant testified (R. 150) that he and Mr. Sumsion
bid jointly on the job at :McGill, Nevada. The bills of
lading contained in Exhibit 4 designated '' Sumsion and
Glenn'' as the consignees of the road oil used upon the
Nevada job. ~[r. \Yilliam Weir, through whom the road
oil wa:S purchased, testified (R. 452) that his dealings
regarding· the purchase of road oils was with ~ir. J. W.
Sumsion. Exhibits D and E (R. 460) which were telegrarns directed to Wasatch Oil Refining relating to shipment of road oil were sent by l\fr. J. W. Sumsion. No
written document was introduced to show what was the
distribution of profit and losses, if any, between Sumsion
and Glenn. It is contended that respondents' objection
to the introduction of Exhibit 4 (R. 155) should have
been sustained by the Trial Court for the reason that
the parties who purchased the oil and who shipped it
were Stunsion and Glenn, operating as a joint venture,
and foreign to the instant action. Appellant is not the
proper party to maintain a suit for any loss of profits
resulting from the Nevada road job which was bid upon
jointly hy himself and Mr. Sumsion.
There is an annotation in 32 ALR 120 et seq which
contains a rather exhaustive discussion relating to loss
of profits as an element of damages. As pointed out in
this annot,ation, such damages must have been within
the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered
into the contract, the damages must be certain and unspeculaive and they must be the direct result of the
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breach. At Page 153 of this annotation the following
statement is made:
''Probable profits from the operation of an
unestablished business are too uncertain and conjectural for the loss thereof to form the basis for
the assessment of damage for the breach of contract for the sale of a machine or machinery for
the buyers use.''
It was held in Schaefetr v. Fiedler (Ind.) 63 N.E.
2d 310, that loss of profits because of inability to carry
out a contract with another is not generally recoverable
upon a breach of warranty, since such damage is not
the usual, natural and probable consequence of the
breach, and if recoverable at all, such damages must
be recovered as special damages on the theory that it
was within the actual contemplation of the 'parties and
included in the agreement.
Thus it is seen that there was more than ample
evidence upon which the Trial Court could base its
Finding of Fact Number 9 to the effect that appellant
did not advise respondents that he intended to use the
said truck for the purpose of transporting road oil and
that it was not within the contemplation of the parties
that the truck was to be used for such a purpose. In
view of this a:prpellant is precluded from recovering any
damages based upon any loss of profits incurred by
reason of his failure to haul road oil with the truck.
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POl~T

VI.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 10 TO THE EFFECT THAT
APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE OR ATTEMPT TO HAVE
THE WHEEL BASE OF THE TRUCK SHORTENED AND
THUS FAILED TO EXERCISE THE CARE AND DILIGENCE OF AN ORDINARY, REASONABLE PERSON IN
l\IINil\HZING OR FORECLOSING DAMAGES WHICH HE
MIGHT SUFFER.

The appellant was aware of the fact that the truck
had a long wheel base which would tend to throw too
much weight upon the front tires. He was aware of
this following his first conversation with Mr. Treadway
in _Jfarch, 1946 in which the latter warned appellant
of this probable difficulty (R. 350-351). He was further
advised that the long wheel base would throw all the
weight upon the front axle when Mr. Treadway exhibited
to him the letter received from the Engineering Department of Kenworth Motor Truck Corporation (R. 357).
l\:fr. Treadway testified (R. 400) that there were
numerous concerns in Salt Lake City and surrounding
area that could perform the job of shortening the wheel
base upon the truck. This testimony was substantiated
by that of Mr. Harold Slack, shop superintendent for
Fruehauf Trailer Company, that his concern in Salt
Lake City was capable of shortening the wheel base of
a truck similar to Mr. Glenn's (R. 584).
Respondents, at the request of Mr. Glenn, shortened
the wheel base in January, 1948 and Mr. Glenn testified
that the same performed satisfactorily thereafter. In
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view of the fact that ~lr. Glenn was aware of the cause
of his difficulty, if any, he could have remedied the situation by having the wheel base shortened at any one of
a number of autornotive concerns at a comparatively
low cost. The cost of shortening the wheel base was
established as being in the amount of $277.09 (Exhibit
C). It was incumbent upon appellant to take the steps
which an ordinary, reasonable and prudent man would
do under the circumstances and have the wheel base
shortened, at a cost not to exceed $300.00 and thus
avoid a $25,000.00 alleged loss in profits.
In 81 ALR, 282, the general rule relating to damages is stated as follows:
''The cardinal principle of the law of damages is that the injured party shall have compensation for the injuries sustained. But the
liability of the delinquent is limited to such consequences as are the direct and immediate consequences of his act, and not remote, speculative.
and contingent consequences. And, on the same
principle, where by the use of reasonable measures the plaintiff could have prevented or reduced the loss, his recovery will be limited to
that consideration.''
"The rule applies where the buyer of a
machine, or machinery, for his own use, seeks to
recover for loss of profit as a consequential lo~:-;
growing out of the breach of the contract by the
seller. If all the other elements permitting the
recovery of such damages are present, the buyer
cannot recover for such loss if he might reasonably have avoided it.''
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To the effect that the buyer has a duty to 1ninimize
damages, see the following:
,~ ol. ~3, \Villi~ ton 8ale~,

He..-ised Edition, Page~
378,380;
Restaten1ent of Contracts, Paragraph 336 (d) ;
Yo1. 1, Uniforn1 Laws Annotated, Sales, Page
±23;
liaberkorn vs. Lawrenee (Ill.) 68 N. E. :2d
621;
Bailey vs. Roebuck (Old.) 275 P. 329;
0. C. Barber :.Mining Con1pany vs. Brown
Hoisting Machine Company, 258 Fed. 1 ;
People's State Bank vs. Randby (:!\finn) HJ7
~- w. 265.
The evidence introduced was sufficient to support
the Trial Court's Finding that appellant failed to exercise the care and diligence which an ordinary and prudent person should do in minimizing the damages, if
any.
POINT YII.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 13 TO THE EFFECT THAT
RESPONDENTS AT NO TIME MADE OR GAVE ANY SPECIAL WARRANTY CONCERNING THE TRUCK.

Throughout the preceding portion of this argument
respondents have endeavored to point out the evidence
and testimony which negatived any special warranty
concerning the truck which appellant purchased. In
addition to such evidence and testimony we have appellant's Exhibit 1, which by its express terms limits the
liability of Kenworth Motor Truck Corporation respect-
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ing warranties. On the reverse side of Exhibit 1 there
is contained the following provision:
"THIS IS TO CEHTIFY THAT \VE \V..:\ HHANT each new commercial motor vehicle manufactnred hy us to he free frmn defects in material
and workmanship under norrnal use and service,
our obligation under this warranty being limited
to making good at our factory any part or parts
thereof which shall be returned to us with transportation charges prepaid, and which our examination shall disclose to our satisfaction to have
been thus defective provided that such part or
parts shall be so returned to us not later than
ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle
to the original purchaser, and that at the time of
such return, the said vehicle shall not have been
operated in excess of five thousand (5,000) miles.
This warranty is expressly in lieu of all other
warranties expressed or implied and of all other
obligations or liabilities on our part, and -we neither assume nor authorize any other person to
assume for us any other liability in connection
\Vith the sale of our vehicles.''
Certainly the provisions of Exhibit 1, together with
other testimony and evidence, supports the Trial Court's
finding that respondents at no time made or gave any
special warranty concerning appellant's truck.
POINT VIII.
APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR DO NOT
CONSTITUTE GROUNDS OR REASONS FOR REVERSAL
OF TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT.

In his brief Appellant has set forth ten Assignments of Error upon which he asked this court to reverse
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the decision of the Trial Court. Respondents do not
feel that any of the Assigninents contain grounds for
reversal and that the Trial Court's judgment should he
sustained. \V e will briefly endeavor to discuss and
answer some of appellant's Assignments of Error.
The Trial Court did no't refuse appellant the
right of C'ross-examination. At page 5 of his brief appellant contends that the Trial Court committed error
in refusing him the right of cross-examination. He
refers to R. 82 to substantiate his position. A reading
of this portion of transcript reveals that appellant was
not refused the right of cross examination but was
merely precluded from asking questions which the Trial
Court properly considered to be improper upon cross
examination. Appellant was allowed to cross examine
the witness, Treadway, upon all matters testified to upon
direct examination and appellant was later allowed to
examine the witness fully and completely upon all issues.
1.

2. The Trial Co'ttrt did not commit er'r<O!f' in refusto permit evidence of warranty. Appellant, in his
second Assignment of Error, which is argued on page
7 of his brief, contends that the Trial Court wrongfully
refused him the right to introduce evidence relating to
an advertisement. He refers this court to R. 88-89 of
the record. It need only he noted that the appellant did
not offer into evidence the actual advertisement but
merely tried to prove the same by hearsay. This the
eourt properly refused.
~ng
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3. The Trial Court did not commit prejudicial
error in stating that he would1 ignore le.ading questions.
It is difficult for respondents to follow appellant's argument concerning his third Assignment of Error which
is contained on pages 7 and 8 of his brief. Suffice it to
say that leading questions are improper and subject to
objection and the court may properly disregard answers
to such questions.
The Trial Court di·d not commit error in failing
to impose ·a d!uty upon respondents to furnish equ~pment
that would sustain its ·own weight and .refusing to impose liability upon respond;ents. Appellant's Assignment of Error Number 4 is discussed in his brief at
pages 8-17. Many authorities are cited by appellant to
the effect that a seller may be liable in dama_ges for
breach of warranty for losses directly and naturally
resulting in the ordinary course of events. With this
rule of law respondents have no quarrel. However, as
has previously been pointed out in this brief, respondents made no special warranty and the loss of profits
which appellant contends he sustained were not the
direct and natural result, in the ordinary course of
events, from the breach of any warranty. (See Points
IV, V, VI, and VII of this brief.)
4.

The rules of law set forth by appellant in this argument have no application to the instant case hecause of
the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction which have been set forth previously in this brief
in detail.
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5. Re.spumlenf~ j'unti"'hed appellarnt the t,ype of
f r1.1ck 'll'h icli he specified. Appellants Assignment of
Error Nun1ber 5 is closely aligned with his Assignment
of Error N u1nber 4 and the argun1ent which respondents
have set forth in the preceding paragraph have equal
application to this assignment.
There is testimony to the effect that appellant
ordered the particular truck, despite warnings from
respondents and further it was testified that the truck
as delivered could haul the items, which appellant represented he wanted to haul, if the same had been properly
balanced (R. 361, ~62, 368).
The dama9es claimed by appellant were not
sustained directly and naturally as the result of a bre·ach
of warranty and were not within the contemplation ·Of
the parties. Appellant, at Page 18 of his b:rief, contends
that a judgment for him in the sum of $20,000.00 was
mandatory. He states that the unrefuted evidence shows
that appellant sustained a $20,000.00 loss. This contention has been fully covered in the preceding portions
of this brief wherein evidence and testimony was set
forth to the effect that the hauling of 10,000 gallons
of road oil with the truck was not within the contemplation of the parties, the damages were speculative,
and the appellant got just exactly what he ordered.
6.

7. Sufficient evidence was in,troduced to the effect
that appellant was warned of probable f~ailure of performwnce becau-se of long wheel base. Appellant's Assignment of Error Number 7 is to the effect that the
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Trial Court's finding of Fact Nu1nber 7 is contrary to
the evidence. This contention has been fully covered
under Point IV of this brief. Mr. Treadway warned
appellant of the long wheel base during his first conversation with the latter in 1iarch, 1946 and subsequently advised appellant that the Engineering Department of Kenworth Motor Truck Corporatjon had written a letter in which they questioned the advisability
of the long wheel base.
The testimony set forth by appellant on Pages 18
and 19 of his brief is not inconsistent for the warnings
and other testimony of Mr. Treadway. At the trial :Mr.
Treadway contended throughout that the truck, as delivered, could perform the tasks as outlined by appellant had the latter balanced the loads properly (R. 361,
362, 368).
8. Finding that appellant .requested the truck delivered was not contra,ry to the evidence. Appellant's
Assignment of Error Number 8 is to the effect that there
was not sufficient evidence to sustain the Trial Court's
Finding of Fact Number 5. This contention has been
fully covered under Point II of this brief.
9. Finding that appellarnt could have corrected any
defect in the truck is not contrary to the evidence. Appellant's Assignment of Error Number 9 takes issue
with the Trial Court's Findings of Fact Numbers 9 and
10. This contention is fully answered by the argument
contained in Point VI of this brief.
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\Ye respectfully ~ubmit that appellant has failed
to 8how any error in the trial below. There was sufficient evidence adduced at the trial to substantiate the
Trial Court·~ findings:
(a) That appellant ordered the type of truck
delivered, regardless of warnings from respondents.
(b) That respondents were mere sales agents for
the manufacturer of the truck, which fact was known
to appellant.
(c) That appellant insisted upon the truck as ordered, regardless of a warning from the manufacturer
of the truck.
(d) That at no time did appellant advise respondents that he intended to use the truck for the purpose
of transporting road oil and that the same was not within the contemplation of the parties.
(e) That appellant did not exercise the care and
diligence that an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person
should do in correcting any defect and thus minimizing
the damages.
(f) That respondents at no time made or gave
any special warranty cdncerning said truck.

It is respondents' contention that sufficient evidence was introduced to substantiate all of the foregoing
Findings and that any one of said Findings is suffi-
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cient to sustain the judgment of no cause of action a.s
to appellant's counterclaim. The judgment of the Trial
Court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

CALLISTER, CALLISTER & LEWIS
Attorneys for Restpondents
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